Local public procurement: how to deal with a creative bidder? A case study from the Netherlands by van der Hoek, M. Peter
LOCAL PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: HOW TO DEAL WITH A 
CREATIVE BIDDER?
A CASE STUDY FROM THE NETHERLANDS
M. Peter van der Hoek
ABSTRACT.    This  paper  presents  an  analysis  of  the  procurement  of 
transportation services for the disabled by the town of Ridderkerk. The method 
used consisted of a study of the town’s files and interviews with 11 persons 
involved. The tender specifications were peculiar in that they required bidders to 
submit a schedule with prices per ride for seven classes ranging from 100,000 to 
over 600,000, whereas the real number of rides amounted to 270,000. One of the 
bidders quoted high prices for the first classes and very low prices for the last 
classes. On the basis of all seven classes, he quoted the lowest costs and won the 
contract. However, on the basis of the real number of rides he was the second 
most expensive bidder. 
INTRODUCTION
This paper presents an analysis of a particular public procurement 
case pertaining to the town of Ridderkerk, a Dutch town neighboring 
Rotterdam.  The  town’s  budget  for  a  population  of  nearly  50,000
amounted to €116 million ($173 million) in 2008. Dutch municipalities 
are mandated to extend facilities for their disabled citizens to enable their 
independent participation in society as related to their living situation, 
transport and wheelchairs. Thus, disabled persons can apply for certain 
facilities. As the mandate is open-ended, each application meeting the 
criteria must be approved. A lack of financial means cannot be a reason 
to reject any application. However, the city council had some latitude 
with regard to the following:
- the situations and the form in which facilities can be awarded; and
- the amount of financial compensations.
Public procurement is subject to a number of rules established on 
different legislative levels. First, the European Union issued a series of 
procurement directives prohibiting discriminatory purchasing practices 
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Finance & Banking of the Academy of Economic Studies in Bucharest, 
Romania.(Martin, Hartley & Cox, 1999). The European Court of Justice (EJC) 
developed  a  set  of  basic standards  for  the  award  of  public contracts, 
which were derived directly from the rules and principles of the Rome 
Treaty.  “The  principles  of  equal  treatment  and  nondiscrimination  on 
grounds  of  nationality  imply  an  obligation  of  transparency  which, 
according to the ECJ case-law, consists in ensuring, for the benefit of any 
potential  tenderer,  a  degree  of  advertising  sufficient  to  enable  the 
services market to be opened up to competition and the impartiality of 
the  procedures  to be  reviewed”  (European  Commission,  2006,  p.  C 
179/3). 
Initially,  governments  could  easily  evade  the  rules,  but  later  on 
procurement  directives  were  issued  that  were  considerably  more 
effective. In addition, the new directives also covered services. However, 
the  directives  contained  a  threshold  before  Value  Added  Tax  (VAT) 
below which the rules did not apply. In the case of Ridderkerk analyzed 
in this paper, the threshold amounted to nearly €250,000 ($370,000). 
Second, national law was relevant for public procurement. European 
directives obliged the member states to achieve a certain result, but left 
them  free  to  choose  how  to  do  so.  Thus,  a  directive  is  a  two-tier 
legislative instrument comprising:
- the directive proper, issued by the European Union, and
- national implementing measures, issued by the member states.
If a directive comes into force, it does not in principle imply direct effect 
in national law. Rather, member states must transpose a directive into 
national law, which means adopting national measures to enable them to 
achieve the results stipulated by the directive. 
Third, local governments may issue by-laws. The council of Ridder-
kerk,  for  example,  issued  a  local  act  that  laid  down  a  number  of 
principles for the town’s procurement policy, the most important being 
compliance with national and international regulations and cooperation 
with other local governments where possible.
The contract that Ridderkerk had concluded with a taxi company to 
deliver transportation services for the disabled expired on September 1, 
2003. Therefore, the new contract had to be concluded by this date. This 
paper  analyzes  the  procurement  process.  The  main conclusion  is  that 
Ridderkerk  had  incurred  avoidable  costs  amounting to  €643,500 
($957,000) over a 3-year period. After a brief overview of the literature and methodology, this paper will describe Ridderkerk’s preparation of 
the tender, analyze the bidding process, and explain the consequences.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
The English language literature on local government procurement is 
very scarce. To my knowledge, the Journal of Public Procurement is 
the only scholarly journal covering the subject.
2 Other journals may also 
feature articles on local government procurement, but this is fairly rare. 
An example is Duncombe and Searcy (2007, p. 68) who observed that 
“… very little is known about what local governments do in practice, and 
how procurement practices affect government spending.” They report the 
results of a survey on procurement practices used by New York State 
school  districts,  and  conclude  that  the  use  of  competitive  bidding, 
purchasing  calendars,  central  warehouses,  and  bidders’  lists  was 
associated with significant cost savings.
There  is  some  literature  on  competitive  procurement  in  specific 
countries. Vincent-Jones (1999) addressed the regulatory transition from 
compulsory competitive tendering to the Best Value framework in the 
UK.  While  considering  the  compulsory  competitive  tendering  a 
regulatory  failure,  he  foresaw  a  brighter  future  for  the  Best  Value 
framework.  Martin,  Hartley  and  Cox  (1999)  examined  the  impact  of 
European Union procurement directives on local authority tendering and 
contract award behavior and presented the findings from a case study of 
a British local authority (Leeds City Council). They concluded that, in 
the case of Leeds, there was a tendency to award contracts to domestic 
firms, which is consistent with an analysis of local authority contract 
award data for 1993 revealing that over 98% of all awards were made to 
domestic firms.
Lundberg  (2005)  surveyed  all  Swedish  municipalities  about  their 
procurement  of  cleaning  services.  Depending  on  the  volume  of  the 
procurement,  the  contracting  entity  could  be  selective  and  limit  the 
number  of  bidders.  To  find  an  argument  to  support  this,  an 
implementation cost was added to the expected payment to the winner. 
The  empirical  results  did  not  support  the  assumption  that  an 
implementation  cost  actually  affects  the  choice  of  procurement 
procedure.  Alexandersson  and  Hultén  (2006)  analyzed  the  tender  for 
train services to northern Sweden. They concluded that the winner’s bid 
seemed to have been predatory by intention. It was based on unrealistic 
assumptions, price dumping and/or cross-subsidization, while there was a risk  that  the  company  would  ask  for  more  compensation  if  the 
calculation prerequisites were not met. Indeed, the company was able to 
make the  state increase the amount of taxpayers’ money spent  on its 
services. In another article (Alexandersson & Hultén, 2007) the authors 
observed  that  a  lack  of  transparency  pulled  public  procurement  of 
railway  services  even  further  away  from  being  normal  markets, 
ultimately increasing the firms’ perceived gains from strategic bidding. 
Strategic bids disturbed the functioning of the market by making it more 
unpredictable,  which  ultimately  could  deter  more  rational  companies 
from entering and keeping competition healthy and sustainable.
Mardas  and  Triantafyllou  (2001, p.  110)  stressed  that  “public 
procurement law is an economic law par excellence and should not be 
content  with  legalistic  grammatical,  historical,  teleological,  or 
topological  interpretation.  Its  interpretation  should  not  contradict  the 
economic  analysis,  if  it  is  not to  be  governed  by  the  latter.”  They 
presented an arithmetic approach that could help limit the extent of a 
contractor's  capacity  through  qualitative  criteria.  Additional  indicators 
related  to  public  procurement  as  well  as  to  industrial  and  trade 
performance on the product level could also help one see the extent of 
protection  derived  from  public  procurement  policy  within  European 
Union member states. The two series of indicators would introduce a 
primary source of information about the extent of “buy national” policies 
at  the  product  level,  which  could  guide  the  European  Union’s 
competition policy.
Recently, doubts have been expressed in the Netherlands about the 
desirability of compulsory competitive tendering in that its scope may be 
too  large.  Obermann  and  Kostal  (2003)  signaled  some  fundamental 
problems of competitive tendering. They concluded that an obligation 
binding local authorities to put general economic interest services up for 
competitive  tender,  as  intended  by  the  European  Commission,  would 
have considerable medium- and long-term effects on both the process of 
municipal  service  provision  and  the  economic  position  of  municipal 
(public) enterprises. They argued that from an economic point of view, 
procurement through competitive tendering did not appear to be effective 
or  tenable  for  all  general  economic  interest  services  in  (all)  different 
areas. Therefore, they concluded that compulsory competitive tendering 
for service concessions should not be introduced in all areas of public 
services.
My  literature  search  did  not  yield  any  publication  about  local 
government  procurement  of  transportation  services  for  the  disabled. Although the literature did pay attention to predatory bidding, I did not 
find any publication dealing with bidders’ using the tender conditions in 
a creative way such that they seemed to quote the lowest costs, but in 
reality were more expensive than other bidders. This paper analyses just 
such  a  case. The  method used  was  studying the  files  of  the  town  of 
Ridderkerk  and  interviewing  11  persons  involved. Seven  of  those 
interviewed worked for the town (five civil servants, an alderman and a 
councilor), one served as a consultant for a private consultancy named 
D&O, one was the director of the previous transport company, one was 
the director of the newly contracted transport company and one was the 
chair of the local advisory board of the disabled.
PREPARING THE TENDER
Local  authorities  could  collaborate  and  pursue  joint  tendering 
procedures. Indeed, one of the principles of Ridderkerk’s procurement 
policy  was  to  seek  cooperation  with  other  local  governments  in  the 
region. Therefore, Ridderkerk collaborated with the town of Barendrecht 
to tender transportation services for the disabled. The obvious advantage 
of  collaboration  is  that  cooperating  local  governments  will  purchase 
larger volumes, which increases the likelihood of securing relatively low 
prices. 
The  towns  sought  advisory  services  from  D&O  to  guide  them 
through  the  bidding  process  because  they  had  insufficient  in-house 
technical  expertise.  Representatives  of  both  towns  met  with  a 
representative of D&O on March 28, 2003. They made engagements and 
reached conclusions that are laid down in the consultant’s proposal of 
April 11, 2003, which also named the advantages of joint tendering:
- a clear regional system;
- economies of scale that may result in lower transportation costs; and
- shared costs of guidance through the bidding process.
Ensuring that the two towns’ activities are geared to one another is 
considered a requirement for a smooth working of the tendering process. 
Hence,  the  proposal  to  extend  the  existing  contracts  with  the  current 
transportation companies until April 1, 2004, which should provide both 
towns sufficient time to prepare the tender and to respect the terms in 
force.D&O quoted for drafting the tender documents and administering the 
whole  tender  procedure  from  publication  to  judging  the  bids.  They 
claimed  to  have  a  quality  control  system  that  would  guarantee  their 
product’s quality including the following:
- keeping in touch with the customer and third parties;
- registering all correspondence and contracts;
- keeping a timetable and budgetary control; and
- managing coordination and audit of internal activities.
The quotation amounted to a total of €7,950 ($11,900) before VAT.
The procurement department of Ridderkerk criticized the quotation 
heavily. It considered the number of planned consultative meetings very 
low relative to previous procurements and the price too high. Moreover, 
the department wondered whether D&O had responded to Ridderkerk’s 
quote request and why Ridderkerk had not solicited any other quotations. 
Although these comments did not lead to an adjustment of the offer’s 
content,  they  did  lead  to  a  €1,375  ($2,045)  reduction  of  the  price  to 
€6,575 ($9,780). Additional costs (more activities and travel costs) raised 
the total eventually to €7,570 ($11,260). D&O communicated that the 
planned starting date of September 1, 2003 was no longer feasible and 
indicated  that  Ridderkerk  would  have  to  negotiate  with  the  current 
transport company an extension of the contract until April 1, 2004. When 
the alderman commissioned the contract to D&O he also requested the 
addition of some details regarding a specific issue.
The specifications of the tender were finished on October 9, 2003 
and comprised five parts:
1.A general description including requirements bids and bidders must 
meet and the deadline.
2.Selection criteria for bidders.
3.Specifications.
4.A description of the award criterion price consisting of a schedule 
with  seven  classes.  The  first  six  classes  comprised  100,000  rides 
each, whereas the seventh class was open-ended (>600,000). Bidders 
needed to quote a price per ride for each class.
5.A description of the award criterion quality.I have observed that the minutes of the meeting representatives of 
both towns had with a representative of D&O on March 28, 2003 are 
lacking in  the  town’s files.  As  a result, it  is  impossible  to  determine 
whether the quotation was consistent with Ridderkerk’s quote request. 
What can be concluded, however, is that the procurement department’s 
comments
3 had little effect. Moreover, it can be concluded that one of the 
advantages the collaboration with Barendrecht should have had – sharing 
the costs of guidance through the bidding process – had been realized. 
However,  the  documents  do  not  permit  determination  of  whether  the 
other two advantages that had been named had been realized, so this 
remains unclear.
THE BIDDING PROCESS
When the deadline expired on November  27, 2003, five bids had 
been received. One of them appears to contain an unusual price structure. 
Table 1 displays the price structures of the five bids and Table 2 the total 
annual  costs depending  on  the  number of rides.
4 Table  1  shows how 
unusual bidder A’s price structure was. The price per ride in the first 
class was high relative to the other bidders, while the price in the second 
class was the second highest of the five bidders. However, A’s price in 
the other classes was lower than in any other bid. In particular the price 
per ride in the highest two classes (500,001-60,000 and >600,000) was 
very low. 
D&O’s method awarded a score to each specific price per ride. It 
awarded the highest score to the lowest price, whereas it awarded another 
score to each other price on the basis of the formula (Pl/Px) times the 
maximum score, where Pl was the lowest price and Px any other price. 
For example, bidder C offered the lowest price of €2.74 in the first class 
(≤100,000 rides). Thus, it received the maximum score of 150. As bidder 
A’s price in the first class amounted to €5.22 ($7.76), A received a score 
of (2.72/5.22)*100 = 78.7 in the first class. A’s price in the third class 
(200.001-200,000) was the lowest, so A received the maximum score 
(150). In the highest three classes (300,001-400,000, 400,001-500,000 
and  >600,000)  A  also  offered  the  lowest  price  (€1.39  or  $2.07)  and 
received  again  the  maximum  score  (50).  Bidder  B offered  a  price  of 
€3.58 ($5.32) in the highest class (>600,000) and received a score of 
(1.39/3.58)*50 = 19.4.
TABLE 1






score Price Score Price Score Price Score Price Score Price Score
≤100,000 150 5.22 78.7 4.43 92.8 2.74 150.0 3.24 126.9 3.55 115.8
100,001-
200,000 150 4.03 109.4 4.25 103.8 2.94 150.0 3.21 137.4 3.52 125.3
200,001-
300,000 150 2.11 150.0 4.06 78.0 2.87 110.3 3.18 99.5 3.48 90.9
300,001-
400,000 100 1.67 100.0 3.87 43.2 2.83 59.0 3.14 53.2 3.45 48.4
400.001-
500.000 50 1.51 50.0 3.77 20.0 2.75 27.5 3.10 24.4 3.42 22.1
500,001-
600,000 50 1.39 50.0 3.68 18.9 2.59 26.8 3.04 22.9 3.39 20.5
>600,000  50 1.39 50.0 3.58 19.4 2.49 27.9 2.98 23.3 3.36 20.7
Total 588.1 376.1 551.5 487.6 115.8Table  2. Annual Costs 
Number of 
rides per 
year Annual costs at x rides
Bidder A Bidder B Bidder C Bidder D Bidder E
100,000 522,000 443,000 274,000 324,000 355,000
200,000 925,000 868,000 568,000 645,000 707,000
300,000 1,136,000 1,274,000 855,000 963,000 1,055,000
400,000 1,303,000 1,661,000 1,138,000 1,277,000 1,400,000
500,000 1,454,000 2,038,000 1,413,000 1,587,000 1,742,000
600,000 1,593,000 2,406,000 1,672,000 1,891,000 2,081,000
270,000 1,072,700 1,152,200 768,900 867,600 950,600
Table 2 shows that bidder A offered the lowest total cost on the basis 
of 600,000 rides per year. However, the number of rides at the time of 
the  tender  amounted  to  270,000  per  year.  The  town  of  Ridderkerk 
expected this number to rise, but I did not find any quantification of this 
expectation  in  the  town’s  files.  It  seems  extremely  unlikely  that  the 
number of rides would more than double to over 600,000 per year. Even 
if  the  number of rides  would grow by 10%  the  new total  would not 
exceed 300,000 rides per year. I did not find any justification for this 
schedule. Thus, it is unclear why bids had to be based on more than 
600,000 rides per year.
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Obviously, bidder  A was the  only one understanding the  chances 
D&O’s tender specifications offered. By including a high price in the 
first two classes of his bid, A reduced his score on the price criterion. 
However, by offering very low prices in the other classes he made this 
up. As a result, bidder A received the highest total score on the price 
criterion. A would undoubtedly have considered that the very low prices 
in the higher classes were irrelevant as the number of rides would not 
exceed 300,000 per year. In Table 2 I have also included the total costs if 
the annual number of rides would total the same number as at the time of 
the tender (270,000). In this case A was not the bidder with the lowest 
costs, but rather the second most expensive bidder.
Ridderkerk conferred with D&O about the schedule and proposed 
another  scoring  method.  However,  the  tender  specifications  had  been 
published and could not be legally changed during the bidding process. 
Thus, bidder A appeared to  be the lowest bidder given the  published specifications. Although it was not possible to change the specifications, 
Ridderkerk could have stopped the tendering procedure and started the 
whole procedure over again on the basis of new specifications. However, 
this is not what the town decided to do. It did not choose to stop, but 
rather continued the procedure. 
On  March  2,  2004,  the  town  of  Ridderkerk  took  the  preliminary 
decision to contract the transportation services for the disabled out to 
bidder A, which is Taxi Bakker. Subsequently, one of the other bidders 
asked questions about this decision, including a question about possible 
unusual  price  quotations.  Ridderkerk  responded  by  saying  that  the 
question was irrelevant  and the  bidder did  not  formally object to  the 
preliminary decision. As there were no other reactions, the decision to 
contract out to Taxi Bakker became final on March 24, 2004.
CONSEQUENCES
Ridderkerk’s contract with Reyertax, the current transport company, 
would originally expire on August 31, 2003, but had been extended until 
April 1, 2004, the date by which the bidding process should have been 
finished and the newly contracted transport company should have taken 
over.  However, the  delay in  finalizing the  contract with  Taxi  Bakker 
forced  Ridderkerk  to  move  the  starting  date  to  October  1,  2004. 
Therefore, the contract with Reyertax was again extended, until October 
1,  2004  and  at  a  5%  reduced  cost  level.  As  a  result,  the  towns  of 
Barendrecht and Ridderkerk had different starting dates and, thus, also 
different  ending dates:  April 1,  2007  for  Barendrecht  and October  1, 
2007 for Ridderkerk. 
Ridderkerk’s  delay  affected  the  costs  of  Barendrecht  because  it 
would  enter  the  classes  with  lower  prices  per  ride  at  later  dates. 
Therefore, Barendrecht submitted a claim to Ridderkerk as compensation 
for the higher costs resulting from Ridderkerk’s delayed starting date.
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Barendrecht demanded an advance of €76,744 ($114,500) for the period 
June-September 2004, but agreed after mutual consultations to a reduced 
amount of €36.254 ($54,100). Further consultations led to the agreement 
that Barendrecht would have a second look at its claim and Ridderkerk 
would make its own calculation.
In February 2005, Ridderkerk communicated that there was no cost 
disadvantage  for  Barendrecht  if  Taxi  Bakker  invoiced  the  two  towns 
correctly. Therefore, Ridderkerk requested Barendrecht to withdraw its 
claim.  Although Barendrecht  did  not  respond,  Ridderkerk’s  third program monitor 2006 - adopted on November 2, 2006 - showed that it 
paid €24,700 ($36,900) to Barendrecht in March 2006. Ridderkerk’s files 
are  not  complete  and  do  not  contain  documents  that  clarify  which 
agreements the two towns had reached and how this problem eventually 
was solved. Given that Ridderkerk never promised any compensation it 
is not clear why it honored Barendrecht’s claim anyway.
It seems obvious that Ridderkerk had made avoidable costs. I define 
avoidable costs as the total costs minus the costs that would not have 
been incurred if the contract had been awarded to the lowest bidder, but 
was also timely so that the services could have started on time and no 
extensions of the contract with the current transport company had been 
necessary. There are two reasons underlying the avoidable costs:
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1.The contract was not awarded to the lowest bidder. The total costs 
for the two towns would have been €303,800 ($453,300) per year 
lower at 270,000 rides per year. Given Ridderkerk’s share amounting 
to €167,100 ($249,300). the avoidable costs for Ridderkerk due to 
not selecting the lowest bidder total €501.300 ($747,900) over the 3-
year-period: October 1, 2004-October 1, 2007.
2.Ridderkerk had to extend the contract with Reyertax (the previous 
transport company) due to the fact that Taxi Bakker was unable to 
start  on  time.  The  costs  of  extending  the  contract  with  Reyertax 
exceeded the costs of the lowest bidder by €117,500 ($175,300). In 
addition, the late start of Taxi Bakker had led to Barendrecht’s claim 
of €24,700 ($36,900) on Ridderkerk. Thus, the total avoidable costs 
due  to  the  late  start  of  Taxi  Bakker  amounted  to  €142,200 
($212,200). 
It is now clear that the overall total avoidable costs for Ridderkerk 
amounted to €643,500 ($960,200) over the whole period, which was over 
36% of the amount Ridderkerk was tendering. The council of Ridderkerk 
accepted  this  without  drawing  any  political  conclusion  regarding  the 
alderman responsible for the tender. Therefore, there seemed to be no 
pressure on the town’s mayor and aldermen to draw lessons from this 
failure.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Dutch  municipalities  are  mandated  to  extend  facilities  for  their 
disabled citizens to enable them to participate independently in society. 
Therefore, they need to tender transportation services for the disabled. This paper presents an analysis of the procurement of these services by 
the town of Ridderkerk. A problem that I frequently encountered is that 
the town’s files are far from complete, not only because documents are 
simply lacking, but also because minutes of meetings were sometimes 
not  made  in  the  first  place.  As  a  result,  it  is  not  always  possible  to 
ascertain what was agreed and arranged. For example, due to missing 
documents,  the  files  do  not  afford  determination  whether  D&O’s 
quotation was consistent with Ridderkerk’s quote request.
Ridderkerk  collaborated  with  the  town  of  Barendrecht  to  tender 
transportation services for the disabled. Because they had insufficient in-
house technical expertise, their procurers sought advisory services from a 
private consultancy (D&O) to guide them through the bidding process. 
The procurement department criticized D&O’s quotation heavily, which 
led to a reduction of the price by €1,375 ($2,051) to €6,575 ($9,810), but 
not  to  an adjustment of the  offer’s  content. The  tender  specifications 
D&O drafted  were peculiar in  that they required  bidders to  submit  a 
schedule with prices per ride for seven classes ranging from ≤100,000 to 
>600,000, whereas the real number of rides amounted to 270,000 at the 
time of the tender. Even if the number of rides would have grown by 
10%, the new total would not have exceeded 300,000 rides.
One of the five bidders (Taxi Bakker) understood the chances this 
schedule offered. By quoting high prices in the first classes and very low 
prices in the last classes he obtained a high score on the award criterion 
price. In practice, only the high prices in the first three classes would be 
relevant as the number of rides per year did not exceed 300,000. On the 
basis of all seven classes (up to >600,000 rides per year) Taxi Bakker 
was  the  lowest  bidder.  Therefore,  the  contract  was  awarded  to  Taxi 
Bakker. However, on the basis of the real number of rides (270,000 per 
year) he was the second most expensive bidder.
Ridderkerk could have discontinued the tender before preliminarily 
awarding the contract to Taxi Bakker. Next, the town could have started 
a  new  bidding  procedure  on  the  basis  of  another  schedule  with  four 
classes ranging from ≤100,000 up to >300,000 rides per year. It goes 
without saying that starting a new tender would have required another 
extension of the current contract, which would have caused additional 
costs. However, these costs would have been considerably lower than the 
avoidable costs Ridderkerk incurred. The town’s crucial mistake was that 
it  did  not  terminate  the  tender  before  it  had  already  preliminarily 
awarded the contract to Taxi Bakker. The advice the town sought from a 
law  office  about  discontinuing  the  procedure  after  the  contract’s preliminary award was redundant as the town should have known this 
would be illegal. 
Obviously, Ridderkerk incurred avoidable costs. These costs totaled
€643,500 ($960,200) over the whole period or over 36% of the amount 
Ridderkerk was tendering. Strikingly, the council of Ridderkerk accepted 
this  outcome  without  drawing  any  political  conclusion  regarding  the 
alderman responsible for the tender.
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NOTES
1. European Court of Justice Cases C-324/98, Telaustria, [2000] ECR I-
10745,  paragraph  62,  C-231/03,  Coname,  judgment  of  21.7.2005, 
paragraphs  16  to  19  and  C-458/03,  Parking  Brixen,  judgment  of 
13.10.2005, paragraph 49.
2. Government Procurement also covers the subject, but this is a (non-
scholarly)  magazine  that  aims  at  providing  practical  content  for 
procurement professionals.
3. The main comments pertain to the price (too high) and the number of 
consultation moments (too low).
4. The total pertained to the costs for the towns of Barendrecht and 
Ridderkerk  together.  Ridderkerk’s  share  in  the  total  amounted  to 
55%.
5. The fact that D&O changed its method later on suggests that they 
learned from this experience and considered the method used in the 
Ridderkerk case inappropriate with the benefit of hindsight.
6. File  1.844.32  WVG  folder  compensation  request  by  the  town  of 
Barendrecht.
7. The calculation below does not include a relatively low amount of 
€850 ($1,265) Ridderkerk paid for unnecessary legal advice about 
the bidding procedure.
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